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THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE IN ENTRAPMENT CASES: 
THE JOURNEY BACK* 
Paul Marcus•• 
I. THE PROBLEM 
An accused who asserts as a defense that the government has violated the 
due process clause in order to entrap him must take a curious position. Nor-
mally, the defendant admits committing the underlying crime and also admits 
- at least for the sake of the due process argument - that the government 
could defeat an entrapment defense by establishing the defendant's predisposi· · 
tion. The defendant then recites the government's activities in connection with 
the underlying crime, and contends that this governmental behavior is so out-
rageous that prosecuting him is unconstitutional. 
Defendants claiming due process violations in entrapment cases have not 
fared well in federal or state courts. 1 For example, in a recent case the defen-
dant showed that the FBI persuaded a woman to provide sexual favors to a 
man to lure him into selling illegal' drugs to government agents. 2 The court 
found this conduct was "very unsavory" but not outrageous enough to dis-
miss the indictment. 3 In another case a government drug agent provided every-
thing the defendant needed to establish an illegal drug laboratory. 4 Despite 
proof that the agent sent the defendant the chemicals necessary for the lab 
and advised him about the manufacturing process on more than a dozen occa-
sions, the court did not find a due process violation.~ And, in a well- publi-
cized Ninth Circuit case, despite findings that the government agent explained 
the details of a counterfeit credit card scheme to the defendant, proposed that 
the defendant establish such an operation, supplied the defendant with coun-
• Copyright 1990 by Paul Marcus. 
•• Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. I thank my colleagues Jane 
Kom, Tom Sullivan, and David Wexler for their thoughtful reviews of drafts of this work. 
l. Certainly, the argument has proved more successful in state courts than in federal courts. 
See generally, P. MARcus, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 308-14 (1989) (state judges often take more 
expansive view of due process claims, particularly in light of individual state constitutional provi-
sions). 
2. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 
(1987). 
3. 813 F.2d at 146.5. 
4. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 383-84 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 
(1982). 
S. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d at 384. The court did note that these facts "set the 
outer limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes." /d. 
at 387. 
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terfeit credit cards, and then arrested the defendant when he used the cards, 
the court affirmed the conviction. 6 
It will take a great deal to persuade courts that entrapment·like schemes 
violate due process. 7 Some courts have announced that they have never over-
turned convictions on this basis.8 Nevertheless, the due process claim- while 
not thriving- is alive and beginning to be considered· seriously in at least one 
important area. It is my purpose here to applaud this development and pro-
mote its growth. 
II. THE LAW 
Though often raised together, the due process claim and the entrapment de-
fense are distinctly and significantly different. In most jurisdictions in the 
United States the entrapment defense looks to the subjective state of mind of 
the defendant to determine if she was predisposed to commit the crime prior 
to any governmental instigation. 9 The due process defense looks to the activi-
ties of the government officers - rather than the activities of the defendant -
in an attempt to determine whether the government has overstepped the 
boundaries of what Justice Cardozo called standards "implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty." 10 As the Ninth Circuit succinctly stated, the due process 
claim "differs from a claim of entrapment. The entrapment defense turns on 
the defendant's predisposition. The test laid_ down here focuses exclusively on 
the government's conduct. Thus, while both issues may arise in a case, they 
present analytically different questions. " 11 The second major difference be-
6. United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1988). 
Numerous other examples could demonstrate the difficulty of succeeding on a due process defense 
in entrapment cases. See, e.g., United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1987) (no due 
process violation when government agents offered college student $200,000 finder's fee to secure 
supply of cocaine for government agent); United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(government's unsolicited offer of almost $1,000,000 to defendants to persuade them to make ille-
gal use of lawful resource was not constitutional violation), reh'g en bane granted, 906 F.2d 1384 
(1990). 
In Luttrell the due process violation was found, but it was linked to the lack of a reasonable 
suspicion to initiate an undercover operation rather than the "shocking" behavior on the part of 
the government agents. !d. at 811; see infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth 
Circuit development of reasonable suspicion test). 
7. While difficult, it is not impossible to persuade the courts of such due process violations. 
See infra note 24 (citing cases recognizing validity of due process claim). 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir. 1989). 
9. The federal system and about three-quarters of the states use this "subjective" approach. 
About a dozen states follow an "objective" approach to determine whether the government's con-
duct was inappropriate. See P. MAlleus, supra note I, at 41-51 (1989) (outlining objective and 
subjective tests of various states). 
10. Palko v. Connecticut, ·302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
II. United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d at 813 n.7 (citations omitted). Unfortunately, the two 
concepts are merged in several opinions, clouding the distinct nature of entrapment and due proc-
ess claims. In Miller, the court discussed the defendant's unavailing due process defense claim and 
emphasized the fact that the defendant "most importantly ... failed to refute the government's 
substantial evidence of his predisposition to distribute cocaine." 891 F.2d at 1268. When the due 
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tween these defenses is that the entrapment assertion normally is resolved as a 
question of fact by the jury,•:z while the due process contention. which focuses 
on the limitations of the Constitution, is determined by the judge as a matter 
of law. 13 
The Supreme Court decided United States v. Russe/114 on entrapment 
grounds, 13 but also referred to the possibility of a due process ground for re-
versing the conviction. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted that 
due process might be violated when "the conduct of law enforcement agents is 
so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government 
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction."16 
When Justice Rehnquist apparently attempted to retreat from this independ-
ent due process ground in Hampton v. United States. 11 Justice Powell wrote a 
concurring opinion to recognize the legitimacy of the due process defense and 
at the same time narrow the defense18 to cases when "[p)olice over-involve-
ment in crime . . . reach[es] a demonstrable level of outrageousness." 19 Justice 
Brennan echoed this view of a valid but limited due process defense in Mat-
thews v. United StatesZ0 when he stated that "some governmental conduct 
might be sufficiently egregious to violate due process. " 21 
Few convictions, at the federal or state level, n have been reversed on the 
ground that the defendant was entrapped as a result of a due process viola-
tion.23 Yet the doctrine of an independent due process defense consistently has 
process claim is properly viewed as a separate defense, the question of the defendant's predisposi· 
tion becomes irrelevant. The court's focus should be on the nature of the government's conduct. 
The court in Luttrell correctly stated the law when it observed, "(u]nlike the defense of entrap-
ment, the defense of outrageous government conduct is available even if a defendant was predis-
posed to convict the crime." 889 F.2d at 811. 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Janotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en bane) (issue of predisposi-
tion of defendant for jury to decide), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). • 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Graves, SS6 F.2d 1319, 1322 (5th Cir. 1977) (due process claim 
is question of law for the judge), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978). 
14. 411 u.s. 423 (1973). 
IS. The Court found that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. ld. at 436. 
16. ld. at 431-32. 
17. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court should recognize a due proc-
ess defense only if the government's outrageous conduct actually violated a right of the defendant. 
Jd. at 490. As Judge Easterbrook stated in Miller, this would mean violation of "a personal right 
secured by the Constitution rather than invented for the occasion." United States v. Miller, 891 
F.2d at 1271 (Easterbrook, I., concurring). Justice Rehnquist's opinion on this point in Hampton 
gathered the support of only two other Justices (Chief Justice Burger and Justice White). Hamp-
ton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 485. 
18. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 49() (Powell, J., concurring). 
19. Id. at 495 n.7. 
20. 485 u.s. 58 (1988). 
21. ld. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing due process defense but deciding case on 
5tatutory interpretation and federal common law rather than Constitution). 
22. Unquestionably state judges have been far more sympathetic to constitutional claims of 
defendants than federal judges. See supra note I (state judges often take more expansive view of 
due process claims). 
23. One of the broade5t uses of the due process claim in the federal courts may be found in 
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been reaffirmed. 24 While some would question the continued validity of the 
due process defense,2~ most of those who are critical of the defense recognize 
its validity but call for a narrow application of it. 26 
United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), where government agents were intimately 
involved in setting up and running a drug laboratory. In United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 
1086 (3d Cir. 1975), the court never mentioned due process but reversed a conviction, stating that 
the nature and extent of government agents' involvement - in both selling narcotics to the defen-
dant and buying them back from him - was intolerable. 
24. Many courts have explicitly noted the validity of the due process claim. See, e.g., United 
States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1985) (recognizing due process defense in context of the 
difficulty of proving claim in _contraband cases); United States v. Graves, S56 F.2d at 1322 (ac-
knowledging due process claim and holding that whether defendant prevails is question of law for 
judge); State v. Pleasant, 38 Wash. App. 78, 82, 684 P.2d 76}, 764 (1984) (government actions 
must be outrageous to sustain due process claim). 
Most courts, however, have been reluctant to ground decisions on a due process foundation. 
For example, in drug procurement cases, some courts have taken the position that a due process 
violation will only be found where the government has "engineered and directed the criminal en-
terprise from start to finish." United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir; 1986). 
25. Based on Chief Justice Rehnquist's language in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 
490, and the Court's opinion in United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), Judge Easterbrook 
of the Seventh Circuit has rejected. the notion that a due process claim is stiii valid. In Poyner the 
defendant challenged the search of a bank vice president's briefcase on both fourth amendment 
and due process grounds. The Court refused to apply the due process standard, noting that the 
defendant could not assert that the government's activity violated any protected right of his. 
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. at 737 n.9. The Poyner case is not fully on point, however, 
because the opinion emphasized the particular defendant's inability to show a privacy interest vio-
lated by a search of someone else's briefcase. Justice Powell was concerned about extending "the 
supervisory power to supress evidence." Jd. at 734. 
Judge Easterbrook's concurring opinion in United States v. Miller argues that there is no due 
process contention and that as a matter of policy "when push comes to shove, we should reject 
the contention that the criminal must go free because the constable was too zealous." United 
States v. Miller, 891 F.2d at 1271. The majority in Miller recognized that some have questioned 
the continued validity of the due process claim but wrote that a prosecution could be precluded if 
the government's conduct "violated that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of 
justice,' mandated by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." /d. at 1267 (quoting 
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432). 
26. Judge Fagg, dissenting in United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1004 (8th Cir.), rev'd, 
-- F.2d -- (8th Cir. 1990) (en bane), on the reach of the due process clause, nevertheless recog-
nized its continued validity: · 
This court "may some. day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of Jaw 
enforcement agents [in initiating an undercover investigation) is so outrageous that 
due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial 
processes to obtain a conviction, [but Jacobson's case] is distinctly not of that 
breed." 
893 F.2d at 1004 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32); see infra notes 74-84 and 
accompanying text (discussing United States v. Jacobson). 
While judges have not been enthusiastic about applying the due process principle il1 the entrap-
ment lll'ea, most commentators have strongly argued for a broader due process defense. See, e.g., 
Marcus, Toward an Expanded View of the Due Process Claim in Entrapment Cases, 6 GA. ST. 
U.L. REv. 73 (1989) (due process defense in entrapment cases should be expanded); Mascolo, Due 
Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Conduct that Shocks the Conscience: The Right Not to be 
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III. THE CHALLENGE 
Some judges have specifically called for abolition of the due process defense 
in entrapment cases. Until recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist himself has been 
the most visible and vocal opponent of this application of the due process 
clause. He argued, for a three-Justice plurality in Hampton v. United States, 
that due process principles should be applied in entrapment cases only "when 
the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the defen-
dant. " 27 
This is a curious view of the application of ~ue process. Presumably the 
argument is that unless the defendant would otherwise have a substantive con-
stitutional right to raise, he ought not be able to seek protection under a 
broad interpretation of the due process clause. But in cases in which other 
rights have been violated, defendants do not normally need to rely on the 
protection of the due process clause. In a situation in which an improper 
search or a prohibited interrogation implicates fourth or fifth amendment con-
cerns, for example, the defendant usually will not need to argue due process 
values because his position will already have been vindicated by the suppres-
sion of evidence. 
A more fundamental objection to this narrow view of the application of the 
due process clause is its underlying assumption that the due process violation 
concerns only the particular defendant in the particular case where the govern-
ment action is called into question. This is analogous to the rule that individ-
ual defendants have standing under the fourth or fifth amendments only if 
their personal privacy interests have been directly affected by the government's 
activities. 28 Due process concerns, however, never have been applied so nar-
rowly or defined so exclusively. Instead, throughout our history the Supreme 
Court has discussed broadly the impact of the due process clause in criminal 
cases. The Court has. not related the government conduct to the individual 
involved; instead the Court has spoken in terms of activity that is, in Justice 
Rehnquist's .words, "so outrageous [that the government is absolutely barred] 
from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction." 29 
Enticed or Induced to Crime by Government and its Agents, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. I (1984) 
(same); Abramson & Lindeman, Entrapment and Due Process in the Federal Courts, 8 Aw. J. 
CRIM. L. 139 (1980) (same). 
27. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490. 
28. Consider Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979), where 
the Court, per Justice Rehnquist, held that fourth amendment claims could be asserted only by 
individuals who could demonstrate that 
the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the critni-
nal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in 
turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has in-
fringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to 
protect. 
/d. at 140. 
29. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32. 
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Justice Frankfurter spoke directly to this point of broad constitutional prin-
ciples in the most famous of the due process cases, Rochin v. Ca/ijornia,30 in 
which the defendant was forced to have his stomach pumped. The question 
the courts should evaluate, Justice Frankfurter wrote, is whether the govern-
ment behavior would "offend those canons of decency and fairness which ex-
press the notion of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those 
charged with the most heinous offenses. " 31 This language is broad, and it 
hardly focuses on the defendant's need to demonstrate, besides shocking gov-
ernmental activities, a violation of a particular right of that .defendant. 
Perhaps the best refutation of the Rehnquist position is found in an opinion 
written by Judge Henry Friendly in United States v. Archer.32 In apparent an-
ticipation of the Rehnquist "added constitutional right violation" argument, 
Judge Friendly wrote of the shocking government behavior in a hypothetical 
case in which the defendant's direct constitutional rights might not otherwise 
have been violated: 
[T]here is certainly a: limit to allowing governmental involvement in 
crime. It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit government 
agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence 
to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums. Governmental 
"investigation" involving participation in activities that res~lt in in-
jury to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be 
extremely reluctant to sanction. Prosecutors and their agents natu-
rally tend to assign great weight to the societal interest in appre-
hending and convicting criminals; the danger is that they will assign 
too little to the rights of citizens to be free from governmental-in-
duced criminality. 33 
Judge Friendly was correct. We should not permit the government to prose-
cute individuals where the government conduct itself was outrageous or egre-
gious. We should not permit such prosecutions, not because a particular 
person's rights were violated, but rather because such government activity, in 
Justice Frankfurter's words, does "more than offend some fastidious squea-
mishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. 
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. " 34 
30. 342 u.s. 165 (1952). 
31. /d. at 169. Justice Frankfurter also made the following statement in his dissenting opinion 
in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 14S (1947): 
It is vital, no doubt, that criminals should be detected, and that all relevant evidence 
should be secured and used. On the other hand, it cannot be said too often that 
what is involved far transcends the fate of some sordid offender. Nothing less is 
involved than that which makes for an atmosphere of freedom as against a feeling 
of fear and repression for society as a whole. 
/d. at 173 (Frankfurter, J., dissentilli). 
32. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973). 
33. Id. at 676-77. 
34. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 172. 
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The argument in recent times against the use of due process principles in 
entrapment cases has shifted away from Justice Rehnquist's "added constitu-
tional right violation .. viewpoint. Instead, more and more often judges attack 
directly the application of the due process clause in cases in which the entrap-
ment defense would be unsuccessful because the defendant was predisposed to 
commit the underlying crime. Judge Easterbrook did this recently in his con-
curring opinion in United States v. Mi/ler.3~ Miller itself was a somewhat rou-
tine entrapment case: the court found against the defendant on both the 
entrapment and due process arguments. 36 The defendant complained of the 
employment of an informer on a contingent fee basis when the informant was 
both the defendant's former girl f~iend and a known cocaine addict.37 The 
majority in Miller had little difficulty finding against the defendant on the 
entrapment ground because the evidence was clear that the defendant had been 
predisposed to commit the crime of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 38 The 
court also found against the defendant on the due process ground because it 
concluded that it was not sure that the government's "behavior was improper, 
let alone 'truly outrageous. • " 39 . 
Judge Easterbrook, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the court's dispo-
sition of the case under the traditional forms of analysis; however, he would 
have gone farther and ended consideration of the due process claim in entrap-
ment cases. He put the matter directly: 
/d. 
When push comes to shove, we should reject the contention that 
the criminal must go free because the constable was too zealous. 
Why raise false hopes? Why waste litigants' and judges' time 
3S. 891 F.2d 1265, 1271-73 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
36. /d. at 1268. 
37. /d. at 1266. 
38. /d. at 1268. The majority stated: 
Most importantly, Miller has failed to refute the government's substantial evidence of 
his predisposition to distribute cocaine. The government was minimally involved in 
Miller's criminal activities; its informant introduced Miller to Agent Squire and set 
up two drug sales. The Constitution does not bar prosecution when the government 
or its employees "merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the 
offense." 
39. /d. The court focused on three main points. First, it had previously adopted the rule that 
contingent fee payments to government informants were not per se outrageous. Instead the trier of 
fact could consider such arrangements as evidence relating to the credibility and reliability of an 
informant. Second, no evidence was brought forward demonstrating that the government had sup-
plied the informant with drugs or had knowingly supported her continued use of drugs. Finally, 
despite a showing that the informant earlier had been sexually intimate with the defendant, both 
the defendant and the informant testified that their sexual relationship had ended before the in-
formant began her employment with the government, they never resumed their former intimacy, 
and the government apparently did not even know about this prior relationship during the time of 
the informant's employment with the government. /d. 
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searching for and rejecting on the facts defenses that ought not ex-
ist as a matter of law. Everyone has better things to do.40 
Judge Easterbrook offered two reasons why the court should reject the due 
process contention. First, he looked to the "false hope" dilemma. The Sev-
enth Circuit has never reversed a conviction on the basis of the "outrageous 
governmental conduct" defense.41 To offer this defense as a serious possibility, 
he seemed to say, is unfair both to the courts and to the defendants. 
Second, and more forcefully, he wrote that the defense is not appropriate 
where narrow standards cannot be fashioned for law enforcement officials. 
Otherwise, he noted, this becomes ''more like a claim that the government is 
violating the community's moral standards. " 42 And, if that is to be the basis 
for the defense, "this is a political problem" and "Congress can hold over-
sight hearings or pass a law; we shouldn't apply a chancellor's foot veto."43 
Moreover, he wrote, even if such a defense were to be viewed as good policy, 
it is simply impossible to apply in specific cases. He stated the proposition 
vigorously: · 
"Outrageousness" as a defense does more than stretch the bound 
of due process. It also creates serious problems of consistency. The 
circuits that recognize a "due process defense" can't agree on what 
it means. How much is "too much"? The nature of the question 
exposes it as (a) unanswerable, and (b) political. What, if anything, 
could separate stirring up of crime in unpalatable ways here from 
the Operation Greylord methods [we] sustained? From the "crea-
tive" endeavors in Abscam? From any of the "sting" operations? 
From the rest of the sordid drug business, so dependent on caitiff44 
assistants? Any line we draw would be unprincipled and therefore 
not judicial in nature. More likely there would be no line; judges 
would vote their lower intestines. Such a meandering, personal ap-
proach is the antithesis of justice under law, and we ought not in-
dulge it. Inability to describe in general terms just what makes 
tactics too outrageous to tolerate suggests that there is no defini-
tion- and "I know it when I see it" is not a rule of any kind, let 
alone a command of the· Due Process Clause. 4' 




44. Webster's defines "caitiff" as "a mean, evil or cowardly person . ., WEBSTER's NEw TwEN-
TIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 254 (2d ed. 1971). 
45. United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d at 1272-7~ (Easterbrook, J., concurring). He continued: 
Methods such as those used to ensnare Miller do not injure bystanders and so do 
not trouble me. Other judges are offended by immorality (such as sponsoring an 
informant's use of sexual favors as currency) or by acts that endanger informants 
(such as supplying them with drugs for personal use) but not by a traditional sting. 
This shows the subjective. basis of the concern - all the more reason not to have 
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Judge Easterbrook's position is forceful, but ultimately it should be rejected, 
as it has been by every one of the federal circuit courts to consider it. Let us 
look at his "false hope" proposition. This surely is an attractive concept, for 
it would seem very wrong to create large hopes in the minds and ·hearts of 
defendants and defense attorneys when we know that these hopes would then 
be shattered by hardnosed federal and state judges. To state the proposition in 
this rather flip fashion, however, is to demonstrate its weakness. As a prelimi-
nary matter, one must question whether any defendant or defense attorney 
raising a due process claim can seriously harbor false hopes. All lawyers in 
this area, both prosecution and defense, know that few cases successfully put 
forth the due process argument. To suggest that defendants and lawyers 
should not have false hopes is to suggest the obvious. 
Moreover, Judge Easterbrook misses the mark on why the presence of the 
defense is important. Its significance lies not in the fact that it will often be 
successful; it will not. Rather it is important because it creates outer limits on 
appropriate law enforcement techniques and because it clearly demonstrates to 
the legal and law enforcement communities, and to society at large, that 
courts are indeed willing to draw some lines that cannot be crossed even in 
pursuit of criminals.46 This, unquestionably, is the lesson of cases such as Ro-
chin. 47 Though it cannot be denied that this principle will be invoked in only 
the rarest of fact patterns, a contrary rule would mean that the claim of out-
rageous governmental behavior could never be raised. The reality that the de-
fense will not often be successful does not eliminate the need for such a 
defense in the unusual case. 
Judge Easterbrook's second argument also has some degree of strength. 
That is, if reasonable people could not possibly agree on the application of 
the defense, doesn't that prove that it is a defense that itself "is not a rule of 
any kind, let alone a command of the Due Process Clause"?48 The initial re-
sponse to this argument must be that it is not factually accurate. There will be 
fact situations where reasonable people could agree that the law enforcement 
behavior was utterly outrageous. Certainly, Judge Friendly's hypothetical prob-
lem of government agents beating some members of a gang in order to get to 
other members of a gang is just such a case.49 So, too, is the similar fact 
pattern in the New York state case of People v. Isaacson. 50 In Isaacson, police 
such a doctrine in our law. 
/d. 
46. In this sense, the due process theory is very much like the exclusionary rule in the fourth 
amendment area, where the rule is not often successfully invoked but its presence is important 
both to deter improper police procedure and promote judicial integrity, as stated first by Justice 
Clark in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
47. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing significance of Rochin v. Califor-
nia). -
48. United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d at 1273 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
49. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77. 
SO. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). 
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agents induced a former drug user to act as an informant against the defen-
dant. The officer convinced the informant by striking the informant "with 
such force as to knock him out of a chair, then kicked him, resulting in a 
cutting of his mouth and forehead, and shortly thereafter threatened to shoot 
him. "'1 Could there be any judge, including Judge Easterbrook, who would 
disagree with the New York court's dismissal of the indictment and condemna-
tion of the police conduct as "police brutality [and] . . . a brazen and contin-
uing pattern in disregard of fundamental rights"?'2 
The application of due process principles in the entrapment area raises 
thorny problems. There will be cases, such as the Abscam investigations, 
where some judges will be shocked and others will not.'3 Is this sufficient rea-
son to abandon the basic principle that outrageous police conduct cannot be 
used as the foundation for a criminal prosecution? The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized the difficulties inherent in the application of the due 
process clause, yet has never retreated from its view that due process princi-
ples are central to our system. Justice Powell made this point in one of the 
famous right to counsel cases, Argersinger v. Hamlin,'• when he noted that 
"due process, perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, embodies 
principles of fairness rather than immutable line drawing as to every aspect of 
a criminal trial."" This, too, was the thrust of Justice Frankfurter's words in 
Rochin: 
Restraints on our jurisdiction are self-imposed only in the sense that 
there is from our decisions no immediate appeal short of impeach-
ment or constitutional amendment. But that does not make due 
process of law a matter of judicial caprice. The faculties of the Due 
Process Clause may be indefinite and vague, but the mode of their 
ascertainment is not self-willed. In each case "due process of law" 
requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in 
the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly 
stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, on a 
judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling 
the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive soci-
ety.S6 
IV. THE RoAD BACK 
The broad attacks on the use of due process principles in the entrapment 
area have not prevailed. Instead, even when entrapment claims prove unsuc-
51. /d. at 515, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
52. /d. at 523, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
53. The vigorous difference of opinion in United States v. Janotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1106 (1982), serves as an example. There the majority was willing to 
permit the question of predisposition to go to the jury as a matter of fact. /d. at 606. The dissent 
argued that the court should determine the question as a matter of law so as to protect against 
the use of police state tactics by the FBI. /d. at 609·10. 
54. 407 u.s. 25 (1972). 
55. /d. at 49 (Powell, J ., concurring). Justice Rehnquist joined in this opinion. 
56. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 172. 
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cessful, we are beginning to see significant opinions emphasizing both the lan-
guage and spirit of the due process clause. The most important of these is a 
thoughtful panel opinion written by Judge Dorothy Nelson of the Ninth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Luttrell." The court's constitutional analysis tracked 
the two traditional bases for due process attacks in the entrapment area. The 
first of these is what the court called the "sphygmomanometer test. "'8 To use 
somewhat plainer language, this test is a reflection of the sort of reasoning 
involved in Rochin: a determination of the conduct by the government to see 
if it is so extreme as to shock the judicial conscience.'9 As Judge Nelson cor-
rectly pointed out,60 and as noted earlier,61 defendants promoting this test have 
not fared well in the courts. Even "very unsavory government conduct'' has 
been insufficient to demonstrate that the governmental activity was "so grossly 
shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice. " 62 
The second due process test involves a more narrowly defined issue. Here 
the question is whether the government "directed and engineered the criminal 
enterprise from start to finish. " 63 While this test is more narrowly defined, 
like the first, it has not been utilized with much success by defendants in en-
trapment cases, principally because few criminal operations truly have been 
dominated· and controlled by government agents. Normally, as in Luttrell, the 
operation is a blend. of the talents of both the defendants and the government 
agents. 
The due process test which forms the basis for the court's disposition in 
Luttrell is one which has been invoked rarely in either state or federal 
courts.64 The test asks whether the government had any reason to believe that 
57. 889 F .2d 806. The record developed at trial showed an egregious situation involving a po-
lice undercover operation. The police, using large sums of money, targeted two individuals in 
connection with the operation without prior suspicion of any illegal activities by the individuals. 
/d. at 808-09, 812; see infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (concerning courts' ability to 
perceive law enforcement necessities and determine appropriate due process limits on police con-
~~- . 
58. United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d at 811. A sphygmomanometer is a device used by doc-
tors to measure blood pressure. /d. 
59. ld. 
60. Id. 
61. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (discussing cases where substantial police ef-
forts to entrap the defendant were insufficient to cause dismissal of case). 
62. United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d at 811. 
63. /d. at 812. Such an operation was found in Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th 
Cir. 1971), where the government established and maintained a criminal bootlegging operation, 
provided essential equipment and ingredients, and was the only customer for the illegal liquor 
production. There, the court reversed because it did not believe that "the government may involve 
itself so directly and continuously over sucb a long period of time in the creation and mainte-
nance of criminal operations, and yet prosecute its collaborators." ld. at 787. 
64. However, the test is not entirely unknown. For instance, in Shrader v. State, 101 Nev. 
499, 706 P.2d 834 (1985), the court found entrapment as a matter of law and held that "when 
the police target a specific individual for an undercover operation, they must have reasonable 
cause to believe that the individual is predisposed to commit the crime." /d. at 501-02, 706 P.2d 
at 836. 
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the ultimate targets of its undercover operation were previously engaged in il· 
legal activity. While the Ninth Circuit never before had established such a re· 
quirement of a reasonable suspicion, 6 ' Judge Nelson noted that it had 
"suggested" this requirement on several earlier occasions.66 Although the court 
may have suggested such a requirement earlier, it had never based a judicial 
holding on it as the three-judge panel in Luttrell did. 
Judge Nelson offered several reasons for the need to establish a reasonable 
suspicion requirement for the undercover sting operation. Foremost among 
those reasons was that the Bill of Rights establishes limits on government con· 
duct in the area of law enforcement and such limits are crossed if government 
operations impact on affected individuals who are "to all reasonable appear-
ances ... minding their own business. " 67 Judge Nelson stated: 
The principle that people who are scrupulously conforming to the 
requirements of the law should not be made the objects of highly 
intrusive, random police investigations is an important ingredient of 
our liberty. We see substantial mischief in any pattern of law en-
forcement that arbitrarily targets for intrusion the lives of indivi-
duals [where there is no specific suspicion]. 68 
The court also observed that spending valuable resources to conduct such 
suspicionless operations results in ineffective and arbitrary law enforcement.69 
Unlike the situation where the government is acting in response to known or 
suspected criminal operations, an operation based on no specific suspicious be-
havior makes little sense. Besides concerns with inefficiency and arbitrariness, 
the court feared that such operations create grave problems of serious depriva-
tions of individual liberty, particularly with the presence of a paid informant 
who is "a member of a group that in its eagerness to gain rewards does not 
always obey the niceties of police protocol. " 70 The court explained the sorts of 
difficulties that could be expected to arise in such cases: 
Many informants play their roles because of completed or prospec-
tive plea bargaining arrangements. They have a strong incentive to 
65. Other .couns have explicitly rejected such a requirement. Indeed, in Miller the court stated 
the rule quite directly: "The Constitution does not require the government to have a preexisting 
good faith basis for suspecting criminal activity before initiating an undercover investigation .... " 
United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d at 1269 (citing United States v Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1198-99 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984)). 
66. In Citro, the court spoke in approving terms of the case in which the government simply 
attempted to attach itself to an ongoing operation for the purpose of closing it down and prose-
cuting the operators. United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d at 1153. Similarly, in Simpson, the court 
noted that there was "no suggestion that the FBI agents created the criminal enterprise. To the 
contrary, the FBI already had a 'tremendous amount of knowledge with regard to [Simpson's) 
activities' when they targeted him for investigation." United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1470. 
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find targets for police investigation, regardless of the reasonableness 
or the accuracy of their information. Their tips to the police may 
be based either on legitimate information about the criminal under-
world or they may be wholly fabricated. The origin of the informa-
tion may be direct observation or it may be innuendo, conjecture or 
even just plain animus. While in some cases informant activities 
may be conducted in a fair and decent manner, in others there ap-
pears to be little regard for fundamental concepts of honesty and 
fair play. 71 
469 
In response to these concerns, the court held that the government must have 
"reasoned grounds" to involve a subject in an undercover operation. 72 In its 
conclusion, the court underscored the need for courts ''to scrutinize these op-
erations for government overreaching and to do so with the greatest care. " 73 
The Luttrell opinion already has generated considerable debate and criticism. 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has agreed to rehear the case en bane. 74 Perhaps the 
sharpest criticism came from Judge George Fagg, dissenting from a panel deci-
sion of the Eighth Circuit. That court, in United States v. Jacobson, 7 j ex-
pressed concerns similar to those which formed the basis of the Ninth 
Circuit's opinion. In Jacobson, by a 2-1 majority, the court also established a 
reasonable suspicion requirement, although it based its holding on a different 
ground than that in Luttrell. The court there held that government undercover 
operations without individualized suspicion would allow the defense to claim 
entrapment as a matter of law, without reaching the constitutional question. 76 
The Eighth Circuit, en bane, rejected this holding and, in an opinion by 
Judge Fagg, found that due process principles - not entrapment law - gov-
ern the involvement of the state in undercover operations. 77 
The court, en bane, spent little time dealing with the panel's holding on 
entrapment as a matter of law. Judge Fagg's dissent in the panel opinion was, 
though, quite stirring. While he argued that the court was actually reaching a 
due process holding in the guise of deciding an entrapment case, 78 his chief 
concern was the basic rationale for the holding. Fagg was even more critical 
71. !d. at 813-14. 
72. The court declined to enumerate "what circumstances may constitute reasoned grounds," 
deferring to the trier of fact to make the initial judgment. Id. at 814. 
73. /d. 
74. United States v. Luttrell, 906 F.2d 1384 {9th Cir. 1990) 
75. 893 F.2d 999 (8th Cir.), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 899 F.2d 1549 (1990). 
76. This is a rather unusual, although not unprecedented view. See supra note 64 (citing an· 
other "entrapment as a matter of law" case). Normally the question is: Did the defendant appear 
reluctant in response to government instigation, i.e. was she predisposed to commit the crime? 
Rarely will the courts ask whether, at the time of the instigation, the government knew of the 
defendant's predisposition. 
77. United States v. Jacobson, No. 88-2097 {8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1990) 1990 WL 152735. 
78. "If the panel believes the government has violated due process by embarking on a suspi· 
cionless investigation against Jacobson, it should say so." United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d at 
1003 (Fagg, J ., dissenting) (citing United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d at 813). 
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of the Ninth Circuit's rationale in Luttrell. Principally, he argued that courts 
could not scrutinize government operations in the manner suggested by the 
majority, for law enforcement officers are in decidedly better positions to un-
derstand the necessities of such operations. 
What the panel has chosen to ignore in this case is the practical 
reality that the investigatory process does not deal with hard cer-
tainties. Law enforcement officers are entitled to draw inferences, 
make deductions, and arrive at common sense conclusions about 
human behavior based on available information and the behavioral 
patterns of law breakers. The accumulated information must be 
"seen and weighed not in terms of (judicial post mortems), but as 
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. " 79 
Judge Fagg's concerns are important and well considered. However, they 
should not lead to a rejection of cases such as Luttrell. While it is certainly 
true that reasonable people can and do differ in interpreting facts to determine 
whether reasonable suspicion exists,80 it is equally true that in some cases there 
will be little question that the government lacked reasonable suspicion and 
there will be serious concern about government abuses. Indeed, Jacobson and 
Luttrell are two such cases. 
In Jacobson the government made the defendant the target of five under-
cover sting operations over a period of less than three years. 81 Government 
agents surreptitiously contacted him more than eleven times before he bought 
obscene written materials and was arrested for possession of obscene materi-
als. 82 The operation was conducted because the defendant had previously or-
dered non-obscene materials from a business that had been searched by the 
government. 83 Prior to this operation, the defendant, a war hero, had no crim-
inal record except for one drunk driving conviction. 84 
The facts in Luttrell are just as striking. In Luttrell the government set up 
an undercover operation to investigate telemarketing illegalities. 85 The Secret 
Service hired an informant who was an acquaintance of Kegley, one of two 
defendants. The informant contacted Kegley and told him that an arrangement 
could be made to sell unauthorized credit card drafts. Luttrell, the second de-
79. ld. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1982)). 
80. Judge Fagg's real concern appears to be that the government actually did prove its case 
that the defendant had been engaged in criminal activity prior to the undercover operation. 
Here, fact on fact and clue on clue afforded a basis for the deductions and infer-
ences that brought the officers to focus on [Jacobson]. Simply stated, the panel is 
unwilling to acknowledge that it is looking at reasonable police work. 
893 F.2d at 1004. 
81. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d at 1000. 
82. ld. 
83. ld. 
84. /d. at 999-1000. 
8S. United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d at 808. 
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fendant, was present at a meeting between the informant and Kegley. Up until 
that point Kegley had been unknown to the government. 86 The moving force 
behind the meetings and the ultimate deal was clearly the government, not 
Kegley or Luttrell. Luttrell and Kegley both were convicted of conspiracy to 
possess illegal credit card drafts and attempt to traffic in counterfeit drafts. 87 
The court made clear that no evidence was offered to demonstrate a prior 
suspicion about either of the defendants. 
{T]here is absolutely no evidence on the trial record that the Secret 
Service possessed any information linking the appellants or their 
business with illegal activity. Nor is there even any testimony on the 
record that the police were aware of criminal activity involving un-
known members of a discrete class or group of which appellants 
might be a part. 88 
Given the facts, it is difficult to defend outcomes other than those rendered 
by the panels in Luttrell and Jacobson. To be sure, Judge Nelson made a 
telling comment in Luttrell when she expressed apparent amazement "that 
competent police investigators , would pursue an operation that has no founda-
tion . . . that at least some indeterminate members of a limited class are en-
gaged in illegal activity."89 Yet that is exactly what happened in both cases. 
Given the serious possibility that fundamental concepts of honesty and fair 
play will be obliterated if there is no factual basis for the undercover opera-
tion, application of the due process clause here is both appropriate and neces-
sary as a matter of public policy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Doubts about the use of due process principles in entrapment cases are sub-
siding. The panel holding in Luttrell should set the standard. Granted, Luttrell 
is limited. If the government can show a factual basis for establishing the un-
dercover operation the prosecution will prevail.90 Thus, the case says little 
about broad concepts of shocking behavior and the involvement of the due 
process clause generally in the entrapment area. Luttrell does, however, strike 
a significant blow on behalf of those who would encourage courts to take a 
tough look at intense undercover operations based on minimal information 
concerning particular individuals. The Ninth Circuit panel's use of the due 
86. /d. 
87. !d. at 809. 
88. /d. at 812. 
89. !d. at 813. 
90. On remand in Luttrell, the government will be given an opportunity to demonstrate that it 
had "reasoned grounds for approaching appellants and offering them the opportunity to partici-
pate in a criminal scheme." /d. at 814. Moreover, there is some indication that the government 
will indeed be able to establish its proof because the "trial record contains hints that the Secret 
Service may in fact have had a factual basis for targeting appellants." /d. The government was 
not allowed to make its case because the district court's summary dismissal of the defendant's 
motion eliminated full development of the record on this point. /d. 
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process clause should be applauded, for it shows a much needed sensitivity to 
the view that "rooted in the Bill of Rights is a concept that the processes of 
criminal investigation move deliberately, purposefully and fairly. " 91 
91. /d. at 813. 
